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> The PKI and TLS standards behind this handbook: IETF RFCs, CA/Browser Forum rules, root program policies, NIST FIPS and SPs, eIDAS and ETSI.

Source: https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/standards/ · Last reviewed: 2026-10-20

Appendix

# Standards index: the rules behind every chapter

**In one sentence:**

The RFCs, CA/Browser Forum documents, root program policies, NIST standards and EU rules that this handbook relies on, each with what it covers and where to read it.

## Who is this for

- [Expert](https://pkizerotohero.com/start/#expert)
- [Developer](https://pkizerotohero.com/start/#developer)
- [IT ops](https://pkizerotohero.com/start/#itops)
- [Leader](https://pkizerotohero.com/start/#leader)

Level: **Expert**

Public key infrastructure is held together by documents. The IETF defines the formats and protocols, the CA/Browser Forum and the browsers’ root programs set the rules for publicly trusted CAs, NIST standardises the algorithms, and EU law gives some signatures and certificates legal weight. This page lists the ones the handbook relies on, grouped by topic, with links to the official text.

Two tips for reading them:

- **RFCs never change once published.** A newer RFC “obsoletes” or “updates” an older one, and the header of each RFC on rfc-editor.org says which. Always check you are reading the current one.
- **Industry requirements change often.** The CA/Browser Forum and the root programs publish new versions several times a year. The links below go to the page that always shows the latest version.

## Certificates and PKI structure

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [ITU-T X.509](https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509) | The original framework for public-key certificates and attribute certificates, which the internet profile builds on | [X.509 certificates](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/x509-certificates/) |
| [RFC 5280](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280): Internet X.509 PKI Certificate and CRL Profile | The internet profile of X.509 (RFC 5280, May 2008): certificate fields and extensions, CRLs and the path validation algorithm | [X.509 certificates](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/x509-certificates/), [names and key usage](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/names-and-key-usage/), [chains](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/certificate-chains/), [revocation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/revocation/) |
| [RFC 2986](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986): PKCS #10 | The certificate signing request format (RFC 2986 (PKCS #10)) | [The CSR](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/csr/) |
| [RFC 3647](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3647): Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework | The standard outline for a CA’s [certificate policy](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/glossary/#certificate-policy) (CP) and [certification practice statement](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/glossary/#cps) (CPS) | [Private CA](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/private-ca/) |
| [RFC 5652](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652): Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) | The signed and encrypted container format behind PKCS #7, S/MIME, Authenticode and timestamps | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/), [file formats](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/file-formats/) |
| [RFC 7468](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468): Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS and CMS Structures | PEM files and their `BEGIN` labels | [File formats](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/file-formats/) |
| [RFC 7292](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7292): PKCS #12 v1.1 | Password-protected bundles of a private key and its certificates (PFX) | [File formats](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/file-formats/) |
| [RFC 5958](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5958): Asymmetric Key Packages | The private key format that succeeded PKCS #8 ([RFC 5208](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5208)) | [File formats](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/file-formats/) |
| [RFC 8017](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017): PKCS #1 v2.2 | RSA encryption and signature schemes, including RSA-PSS | [Key pairs](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/key-pairs/), [digital signatures](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/digital-signatures/) |
| [RFC 9881](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9881), [RFC 9909](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9909), [RFC 9935](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9935) | How ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and ML-KEM keys and signatures appear in X.509 certificates (ML-DSA: RFC 9881, October 2025) | [Post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |

## TLS and names

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [RFC 9846](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846): TLS 1.3 | The current TLS 1.3 specification: the handshake, key schedule and client authentication. Published July 2026 (replaces RFC 8446). | [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/), [mutual TLS](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/mutual-tls/) |
| [RFC 8446](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446): TLS 1.3 (first edition) | The original TLS 1.3 text (August 2018), still widely cited in documentation and code comments | [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/) |
| [RFC 5246](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246): TLS 1.2 | TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246, August 2008), still supported by most servers. RFC 9846 formally obsoletes RFC 5246 and adds requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations ([section 1.4](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846#section-1.4)) | [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/) |
| [RFC 8996](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8996): Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 | Why and how the old versions were retired (March 2021) | [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/) |
| [RFC 6066](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066): TLS Extensions | Server Name Indication (SNI) and the status request used for OCSP stapling | [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/), [revocation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/revocation/) |
| [RFC 9525](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525): Service Identity in TLS | How clients match a hostname against a certificate’s names, including wildcard rules. Published November 2023 (replaces RFC 6125). | [Names and key usage](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/names-and-key-usage/) |
| [RFC 9954](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9954) and [RFC 10024](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024) | Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 (July 2026), and the X25519MLKEM768 group that browsers use (August 2026) | [Post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |
| [RFC 8705](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705): OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS | Client authentication with certificates for APIs, and access tokens bound to a certificate | [Mutual TLS](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/mutual-tls/) |

## Revocation and transparency

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [RFC 6960](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960): OCSP | The Online Certificate Status Protocol (June 2013) | [Revocation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/revocation/) |
| [RFC 7633](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7633): TLS Feature Extension | The certificate extension behind OCSP Must-Staple (October 2015) | [Revocation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/revocation/) |
| [RFC 6962](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962) and [RFC 9162](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162): Certificate Transparency | Public append-only logs of certificates, SCTs and Merkle tree proofs. Both are Experimental RFCs. | [Certificate Transparency](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/certificate-transparency/) |
| [Chrome Certificate Transparency policy](https://googlechrome.github.io/CertificateTransparency/ct_policy.html) | Which logs Chrome accepts and how many SCTs a certificate needs | [Certificate Transparency](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/certificate-transparency/) |

## Issuance and automation

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [RFC 8555](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555): ACME | Automatic certificate issuance and renewal: accounts, orders, challenges, finalisation (March 2019) | [ACME](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/acme/), [domain validation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/domain-validation/) |
| [RFC 8737](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8737): ACME TLS-ALPN-01 | Proving domain control inside a TLS handshake | [Domain validation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/domain-validation/) |
| [RFC 9773](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9773): ACME Renewal Information | How a CA tells clients when to renew (June 2025) | [ACME](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/acme/) |
| [RFC 8659](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659): CAA | DNS records that say which CAs may issue for a domain (November 2019) | [Domain validation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/domain-validation/) |
| [RFC 7030](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030): Enrollment over Secure Transport | A standard way for devices and servers to request certificates from a CA | [Device identity](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/device-identity/) |
| [RFC 8995](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995): BRSKI | Zero-touch onboarding of devices with manufacturer-installed certificates | [Device identity](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/device-identity/) |

## Signing and time

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [RFC 3161](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3161): Time-Stamp Protocol | Trusted timestamps that keep signatures valid after the signing certificate expires | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [RFC 8551](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8551): S/MIME 4.0 | Signed and encrypted email | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [RFC 8032](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032): EdDSA | The Ed25519 and Ed448 signature algorithms | [Digital signatures](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/digital-signatures/) |
| [RFC 7748](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748): Elliptic Curves for Security | X25519 and X448 key agreement | [Key exchange](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/key-exchange/) |
| [RFC 5869](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869): HKDF | The key derivation function inside the TLS 1.3 key schedule | [Key exchange](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/key-exchange/), [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/) |
| [RFC 2104](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104): HMAC | Message authentication codes built from hash functions | [Hashes](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/hashes/) |

## Algorithms and key management (NIST)

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final): Digital Signature Standard | RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA signatures | [Digital signatures](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/digital-signatures/) |
| [FIPS 197](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/197/final): AES | The Advanced Encryption Standard | [Symmetric encryption](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/symmetric-encryption/) |
| [FIPS 180-4](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final) and [FIPS 202](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/202/final) | The SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions | [Hashes](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/hashes/) |
| [FIPS 203](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final), [FIPS 204](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final), [FIPS 205](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final) | The first post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), published 13 August 2024 | [Post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |
| [NIST IR 8547](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/ipd): Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards | The proposed timeline for retiring quantum-vulnerable algorithms: NIST proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms at the 112-bit security level after 2030 and disallowing all of them after 2035. Status: NIST IR 8547 (initial public draft, November 2024). | [Post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |
| [FIPS 140-3](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/140-3/final): Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules | How HSMs and other crypto modules are tested and validated | [HSMs and key ceremonies](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/hsm-and-key-ceremonies/) |
| [SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/57/pt1/r5/final): Recommendation for Key Management | Key types, cryptoperiods and key protection | [HSMs and key ceremonies](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/hsm-and-key-ceremonies/), [private CA](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/private-ca/) |
| [SP 800-52 Rev. 2](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/52/r2/final): TLS Guidelines | Recommended TLS versions, cipher suites and certificate settings for US federal systems, a useful reference for anyone | [TLS handshake](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/tls-handshake/) |
| [SP 800-131A Rev. 2](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/131/a/r2/final): Transitioning Algorithms and Key Lengths | Which algorithms and key sizes NIST allows, deprecates or disallows | [Key pairs](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/key-pairs/), [post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |
| [SP 800-208](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/208/final): Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes | LMS and XMSS, hash-based signatures used for firmware signing | [Post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |

## Rules for publicly trusted CAs

| Document | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements](https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/) | The [Baseline Requirements](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/glossary/#baseline-requirements): everything a publicly trusted TLS CA must do: validation methods, certificate profiles, lifetimes, revocation and audits | [Domain validation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/domain-validation/), [ACME](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/acme/), [revocation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/revocation/) |
| [CA/Browser Forum EV Guidelines](https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/extended-validation/guidelines/) | The extra identity checks for Extended Validation certificates | [Domain validation](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/domain-validation/) |
| [CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Baseline Requirements](https://cabforum.org/working-groups/code-signing/requirements/) | Identity checks, hardware key protection, lifetimes and timestamp authorities for code signing | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [CA/Browser Forum S/MIME Baseline Requirements](https://cabforum.org/working-groups/smime/requirements/) | Rules for publicly trusted email certificates | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [CA/Browser Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements](https://cabforum.org/working-groups/netsec/requirements/) | Security controls for the systems CAs run on | [HSMs and key ceremonies](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/hsm-and-key-ceremonies/) |
| [Chrome Root Program Policy](https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/crp/policy) | Which CAs Chrome trusts and what it demands of them. Version checked: Chrome Root Program Policy, version 1.8, 5 February 2026. | [Trust stores](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/trust-stores/), [mutual TLS](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/mutual-tls/) |
| [Mozilla Root Store Policy](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/) | The same for Firefox and the many systems that reuse Mozilla’s root list. Version checked: Mozilla Root Store Policy, version 3.1, 1 July 2026. | [Trust stores](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/trust-stores/) |
| [Apple Root Certificate Program](https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html) | The same for Apple platforms. Version checked: Apple Root Program Policy, version 2.0, 1 August 2026. | [Trust stores](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/trust-stores/) |
| [Microsoft Trusted Root Program requirements](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/program-requirements) | The same for Windows. Version checked: Microsoft Trusted Root Program requirements, version 1.2, 20 May 2026. | [Trust stores](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/trust-stores/) |
| [CCADB](https://www.ccadb.org/) | The Common CA Database, where CAs disclose their hierarchies, audits and policies to the root programs | [Trust stores](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/trust-stores/), [private CA](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/private-ca/) |

## European law and ETSI standards

| Document | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [eIDAS, Regulation (EU) No 910/2014](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj) | Electronic signatures, seals, time stamps and qualified trust service providers in the EU | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [Regulation (EU) 2024/1183](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj) | Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2.0), in force since 20 May 2024: the update to eIDAS, including the European Digital Identity Wallet | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj) | Cybersecurity duties for essential and important entities, including policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption (NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Article 21(2)(h)) | [Private CA](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/private-ca/), [post-quantum](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/post-quantum/) |
| [ETSI EN 319 411-1](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/31941101/) and [EN 319 411-2](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/31941102/) | Policy and security requirements for trust service providers that issue certificates, and for EU qualified certificates | [Private CA](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/private-ca/), [code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [ETSI EN 319 412](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/31941201/) | Certificate profiles, including qualified certificates | [X.509 certificates](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/x509-certificates/) |
| [ETSI EN 319 421](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/319421/) | Policy and security requirements for timestamping authorities | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |
| [ETSI EN 319 142-1](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319100_319199/31914201/) | PAdES: signatures inside PDF documents, including long-term validation | [Code signing](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/code-signing/) |

## Devices and workloads

| Standard | What it covers | Chapters |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [IEEE 802.1AR](https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ar/): Secure Device Identity | Manufacturer-installed IDevIDs and owner-issued LDevIDs (IEEE 802.1AR-2018) | [Device identity](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/device-identity/) |
| [TCG EK Credential Profile](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/http-trustedcomputinggroup-org-wp-content-uploads-tcg-ek-credential-profile/) | The certificates that TPM manufacturers issue for each TPM’s endorsement key | [Device identity](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/device-identity/) |
| [SPIFFE standards](https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/tree/main/standards) | SPIFFE IDs, X.509-SVIDs and the Workload API for service identity | [Mutual TLS](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/mutual-tls/) |
| [OpenSSH certificates (ssh-keygen manual)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1#CERTIFICATES) | SSH user and host certificates, a simple non-X.509 PKI | [Device identity](https://pkizerotohero.com/handbook/device-identity/) |

Missing a standard you need, or found a link that has moved? [Tell us](mailto:info@pkizerotohero.com?subject=Error%20report:%20Standards%20index).

**Early edition.** Checked against the standards; an independent expert review is in progress. Found a mistake? [Tell us](https://pkizerotohero.com/contact/?topic=content-error&page=/handbook/standards/).

Last reviewed 20 October 2026Edition 0.9