Chapter 12
Who do we trust? CAs, trust stores and self-signed certificates
Every client trusts only the root certificates in its own trust store, so a certificate is accepted only if its chain ends at one of them; being self-signed earns nothing.
Topic
A client trusts a server's certificate only if it can build a chain from that certificate, usually through one or more intermediate CAs, to a root that is already in its trust store. A root is trusted because it is in the store, not because it signed itself.
Most "unable to get local issuer certificate" and "unknown authority" errors come from a broken chain or a missing root. This hub has the explanations, the fixes for each tool and the guides for trusting a private CA safely.
Plain words first, then the real mechanism, what it looks like at work and why it matters.
Chapter 12
Every client trusts only the root certificates in its own trust store, so a certificate is accepted only if its chain ends at one of them; being self-signed earns nothing.
Chapter 13
Servers must send their leaf and intermediate certificates; clients link them by name and key identifier up to a trusted root and check every signature, date and constraint.
Chapter 14
Cross-signing gives one CA key two certificates from different issuers, so a chain can reach either an old or a new root; clients must pick a path that is valid.
Chapter 7
Encryption and signatures only help if you use the right person's public key, so something you already trust must vouch that a key belongs to a name.
Chapter 18
Real PKI failures, from a hacked CA to expired certificates, follow one pattern: a weak point breaks trust, someone notices, and the rules or practices change.
Step-by-step, with real commands and a way to check it worked.
You will have listed every certificate a server sends, checked their order and links, and verified the chain with a strict client instead of a browser.
You will have one PEM file with your certificate followed by its intermediates in the right order, verified offline and proven to work with a strict client.
Your Windows computer, or a whole fleet, trusts your organisation's private root CA, and you know which apps still need their own setting.
Your Mac, or every managed Mac, trusts your organisation's private root CA in the System keychain, and you know which apps need their own setting.
Your Linux server, desktop or container image trusts your organisation's private root CA system-wide, and you know which programs keep their own list.
Your Java program trusts your private root CA, either through the JDK's cacerts or through its own trust store, and you have proved it with a real connection.
Python, pip, requests, Node.js and npm trust your private root CA, through the operating system's store or a bundle file, with verification still fully on.
You will have confirmed that your traffic is inspected, obtained your company's inspection root through a trusted channel, and made each tool trust it with verification still on.
The exact messages tools and browsers print, with likely causes and safe fixes.
They run in your browser. Nothing you paste is sent anywhere.
Tool
Paste a chain and see which link is missing, expired or out of order.
Tool
Paste a PEM certificate and read every field in plain words.
Tool
Paste a certificate error from any tool and get the page that explains it.
Short lessons of about nine minutes each, with check questions.
Every term in plain words, linked to its full entry.